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Global ﬁnancial markets have experienced signiﬁ-
cant volatility in recent years. In two major cases,
actual ﬁnancial crises arose—the ﬁrst emanating from
Asia in 1997 and the second from Russia in 1998. In
both crises, ﬁnancial markets in almost every country
were affected, some suffering considerable declines.
Emerging-market countries, in particular, were sub-
ject to sharp downward market moves.
U.S. banking supervisors monitored these events
carefully to determine the potential effect on U.S.
banking organizations.1 Supervisors analyze informa-
tion on the amount and type of claims on for-
eign counterparties held by U.S. banks to assess
the potential risks from lending, trading, and other
activities conducted by U.S. banks in foreign markets
(see box ‘‘Types of Claims on Emerging-Market
Counterparties’’).2
Because emerging-market countries exhibited
signiﬁcant market volatility in the recent crises,
supervisors paid additional attention to claims on
counterparties in those areas. Furthermore, claims on
emerging-market counterparties are concentrated at a
small number of U.S. banks, which necessitates par-
ticular supervisory scrutiny of the international activi-
ties of those institutions.
A major purpose of collecting country exposure
data is to identify country risk—the potential for a
claim on a foreign counterparty held by a U.S. bank
to become impaired or eventually subject to losses.
Country risk encompasses counterparty credit risk
and transfer risk. Counterparty credit risk relates to
the inability of a counterparty to repay and may arise
from country-speciﬁc factors, such as general eco-
nomic or political disruptions; for example, a sharp
recession in a foreign country might cause a foreign
counterparty to go bankrupt. Transfer risk arises
when exchange-rate difﬁculties (such as a deprecia-
tion or currency controls) impair those claims that are
not offset by local liabilities; for example, a foreign
counterparty might have difﬁculty acquiring U.S.
dollars to repay an obligation that is not denomi-
nated in its home currency. Monitoring claims on
emerging-market counterparties allows supervisors
to identify any developing concentrations of risk that
might warrant supervisory action and, if necessary, to
assess the effect that a potential emerging-market
crisis might have on U.S. banks.3
This article focuses on the claims U.S. banks held
on emerging-market counterparties during the two-
year period from June 1997 to June 1999 and dis-
cusses the different ways that emerging-market
claims can be analyzed. In addition, the article pro-
vides a short analysis of the claims held by other
developed-country banks on emerging-market coun-
tries to show the relative size of U.S. bank claims.
Finally, the data from the 1997–99 period are dis-
cussed in the broader historical context of U.S. banks’
country exposure dating back to 1982.
U.S. BANK CLAIMS ON FOREIGN
COUNTERPARTIES
Country exposure data for June 1997 to June 1999
reveal that the aggregate claims of U.S. banks on
counterparties from all foreign countries rose 11 per-
cent, reaching $756 billion (table 1).4 Cross-border
claims (including revaluation gains) stood at
$423 billion in June 1997 and rose to $461 billion in
June 1999. Local country claims (including revalua-
tion gains) also rose over the period, from $257 bil-
lion to $295 billion. Despite the overall increase in
1. Hereafter, U.S. banking organizations, which include U.S. banks
and bank holding companies, will be referred to as ‘‘U.S. banks.’’
2. U.S. banks report their claims on foreign counterparties quarterly
on the Country Exposure Report of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC reporting form 009). These claims
are aggregated by country and published by the FFIEC as the Coun-
try Exposure Lending Survey (available at www.fﬁec.gov/E16/
default.htm).
3. Supervisors from the Federal Reserve, the Ofﬁce of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
meet regularly within the framework of the Interagency Country
Exposure Review Committee (ICERC) to discuss transfer risk issues
that affect U.S. banks. Examiners present ICERC’s country assess-
ments to U.S. banks to inform them of potentially risky conditions.
4. Data on the claims of individual banks are not publicly available.total claims held by U.S. banks over this period, a
slight drop-off occurred in the ﬁrst two quarters of
1999.
Total claims on counterparties in developed coun-
tries and banking centers rose in the aggregate, from
$485 billion to $572 billion (an increase of 18 per-
Types of Claims on Emerging-Market Counterparties
Data reported on the Country Exposure Lending Survey can
be disaggregated by type of claim to provide a picture of the
various types of exposure.
Cross-Border versus Local Claims
Cross-border claims are those booked outside the foreign
counterparty’s home country, usually at a U.S. bank’s head
ofﬁce in the United States. A claim on a Korean bank
booked at the U.S. head ofﬁce or at the Singapore ofﬁce
of a U.S. bank would in both cases be considered a cross-
border claim. This type of claim is usually denominated in
U.S. dollars.
Local claims on foreign counterparties are those booked
in the local ofﬁces of the reporting bank, that is, ofﬁces
located in the country of the counterparty. A claim on a
Korean bank booked at the Seoul ofﬁce of a U.S. bank is
considered a local claim.
Revaluation Gains on Foreign Exchange
and Derivatives Contracts
On the Country Exposure Report, off-balance-sheet claims
arising from foreign exchange and derivatives contracts
are recorded as revaluation gains.1 U.S. banks continually
determine the market value of these off-balance-sheet
contracts—‘‘revaluing’’ them—to see if a positive or nega-
tive value results (based on movements in market factors or
other variables). If the contract has a positive market value
for the U.S. bank, that is considered a revaluation gain,
similar to a claim in that the counterparty owes a payment
to the U.S. bank.2 For example, if a U.S. bank enters into a
contract with a Latin American bank whereby the U.S. bank
beneﬁts from a rise in the level of the Brazilian stock
market, a subsequent rise in the level of the stock market
would translate into a revaluation gain.3
1. Technically, revaluation gains are carried on the balance sheet, even
though they arise from off-balance-sheet contracts. For the purposes of this
explanation, revaluation gains will be categorized as off-balance-sheet
claims.
2. Generally, if the contract has a negative value, the resulting revaluation
loss is similar to a liability in that the U.S. bank owes a payment to the
foreign counterparty.
3. In March 1997, the FFIEC amended the Country Exposure Report in
two ways. For the ﬁrst time, the FFIEC required the reporting of revaluation
gains on off-balance-sheet contracts (Schedule 2). Also, the deﬁnition for
local claims was altered so that instead of reporting local claims denominated
in local currency, banks report local country claims (and no longer local
currency claims). This change expanded the deﬁnition of local claims to
include those cases in which local transactions in foreign countries were
conducted in non-local currency. If a foreign country had a signiﬁcant
Initial Claims versus Claims Adjusted for Guarantees
Some claims initially booked by U.S. banks may be par-
tially or wholly guaranteed by a counterparty in another
foreign country (or in the United States). U.S. banks report
these initial claims plus any cases in which guarantees on
those claims would shift the ultimate risk from the U.S.
bank to another counterparty. For example, a U.S. bank
might extend a credit to a construction company domiciled
in Thailand, but the claim might actually be guaranteed by a
Japanese bank. After adjusting for the guarantee, the U.S.
bank would report a claim on the Japanese bank and not on
the Thai construction company. Aggregating data on claims
by country reveals, on a net basis, the extent to which a
country has extended guarantees on the initial claims of
U.S. banks. For example, Japanese counterparties might
guarantee a certain amount of claims that U.S. banks have
on other countries over and above the initial claims that U.S.
banks have on Japanese counterparties and, thus, as a group
would be net guarantors.
Example of Types of Claims
The following example shows how different types of claims
are classiﬁed: Bank A has initiated a $400 million loan to a
Taiwanese company that is booked in New York—a
$400 million cross-border claim. But if $100 million of that
claim is guaranteed by a German bank, the adjusted claim is
actually $300 million (the $100 million guaranteed by the
German bank is added to Bank A’s claims on German
counterparties).
Bank A also has a $200 million loan outstanding to
another Taiwanese company that is booked in Bank A’s
Taipei ofﬁce—a $200 million local claim. These two
claims combined (cross-border and local), represent the
total on-balance-sheet claims of Bank A on Taiwanese
counterparties—$500 million. Finally, Bank A has also
entered into an off-balance-sheet contract, arranged in New
York, with a Taiwanese counterparty that has generated
cross-border revaluation gains of $50 million. Total claims
now add up to $550 million, which can be viewed as either
the sum of cross-border and local claims ($350 million plus
$200 million) or the sum of on-balance-sheet claims and
revaluation gains ($500 million plus $50 million).
portion of local transactions conducted in U.S. dollars, classifying claims
associated with those transactions as local rather than cross-border was
considered preferable because generally such claims were locally funded and
hence did not involve transfer risk. For most countries, this deﬁnitional
change had little effect on the amounts reported.
82 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2000cent).5 Cross-border claims rose at about the same
pace as local claims and generally represented two-
thirds of total claims on developed countries and
banking centers over the period.
In contrast, combined cross-border and local claims
on counterparties in emerging-market countries fell
from $195 billion to $183 billion, a 6 percent drop.6
Cross-border claims fell signiﬁcantly over the period,
from $108 billion to $88 billion, while local claims
rose 9 percent, from $87 billion to $95 billion. By the
end of the period, cross-border claims had fallen to
less than half of total claims for emerging-market
countries. Notably, by June 1999, local claims repre-
sented a larger portion of total claims on emerging-
market countries (52 percent) than of total claims on
developed countries (35 percent).
Despite volatile conditions in many emerging mar-
kets in recent years, U.S. banks continued to maintain
one-quarter of their total foreign claims and one-third
of local claims on counterparties in these markets.
Although there was a signiﬁcant retreat from some
particularly troubled emerging-market countries,
claims on counterparties in others actually increased.
These increases may have resulted because U.S.
banks view local business in many emerging markets
as a strategic growth area, largely as a result of recent
market liberalization and the increased openness
to U.S. and other developed-country banks in these
markets.
Claims on Emerging-Market Counterparties
From June 1997 to June 1999, claims on counter-
parties in the countries directly affected by the two
major crises registered serious declines (table 2).
Total claims on the ﬁve troubled countries in Asia—
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand—fell from $55 billion in June 1997 to
$37 billion in June 1999, with claims on Indonesia
and Thailand both dropping more than 40 percent.
Total claims on counterparties in Eastern Europe fell
42 percent, mainly because of a decline in the value
of claims on counterparties in Russia, which plum-
meted from a peak of $9 billion in September 1997 to
$940 million in June 1999.
By contrast, total claims on Latin American coun-
terparties rose 13 percent over the period, driven by
strong increases in Argentina and Mexico. Interest-
ingly, while Latin American ﬁnancial markets experi-
enced considerable volatility over the period, U.S.
banks did not withdraw from that region. For several
decades, U.S. banks have maintained a sizable pres-
ence in Latin America, and two years of crisis in
other emerging markets appears to have solidiﬁed
that position. Thus, during the recent crisis period,
U.S. banks did not retreat from emerging markets
across the board, but only from certain regions; as a
5. Banking centers are countries where international banks often
book assets not associated with economic activity in that country,
mostly for tax reasons or to establish a regional headquarters.
6. Table 2 contains the list of emerging-market countries.
1. Claims of U.S. banks on foreign counterparties, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Millions of dollars except as noted
Item




June 1999 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
All countries ................ 679,613 708,216 710,674 704,884 719,889 728,628 781,784 767,707 755,653 11.2
Cross-border1 ............. 422,493 435,861 446,619 427,900 438,186 440,663 467,733 461,028 460,797 9.1
Local2 .................... 257,120 272,355 264,055 276,984 281,703 287,965 314,051 306,679 294,856 14.7
Developed countries and
banking centers3 ........ 484,503 500,508 507,950 501,105 522,162 543,236 596,662 581,699 572,427 18.1
Cross-border1 ............. 314,819 316,780 330,785 319,972 332,947 348,202 376,186 371,175 372,743 18.4
Local2 .................... 169,684 183,728 177,165 181,133 189,215 195,034 220,476 210,524 199,684 17.7
Emerging-market countries4 . 195,110 207,708 202,724 203,779 197,727 185,392 185,122 186,008 183,226 -6.1
Cross-border1 ............. 107,674 119,081 115,834 107,928 105,239 92,461 91,547 89,853 88,054 -18.2
Local2 .................... 87,436 88,627 86,890 95,851 92,488 92,931 93,575 96,155 95,172 8.8
Memo:
Emerging-market claims
As a percentage of all claims . 28.7 29.3 28.5 28.9 27.5 25.4 23.7 24.2 24.2 . . .
Cross-border claims as a
percentage of all
cross-border claims ..... 25.5 27.2 25.9 25.2 24.0 21.0 19.6 19.5 19.1 . . .
Local claims as a percentage
of all local claims ...... 34.0 32.5 32.9 34.6 32.8 32.3 29.8 31.4 32.3 . . .
1. Cross-border claims are those booked outside the foreign counterparty’s
home country, usually at a U.S. bank’s head ofﬁce in the United States.
2. Local claims are those booked in the U.S. bank’s local ofﬁces in the for-
eign counterparty’s country.
3. See text note 5.
4. See table 2 for a list of emerging-market countries by region.
. . . Not applicable.
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Millions of dollars except as noted
Region and country




June 1999 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Africa ...................... 3,403 3,545 3,119 3,048 3,621 3,609 3,267 3,230 3,216 -5.5
Algeria ..................... 300 332 146 130 270 270 307 119 137 -54.3
Cameroon ................... 0 00004789 . . .
Egypt ....................... 731 730 666 658 1,010 959 937 1,108 1,184 62.0
Ethiopia .................... 1 01001212 100.0
Gabon ...................... 44 42 52 46 47 58 61 50 47 6.8
Ghana ...................... 147 173 228 205 204 48 56 76 82 -44.2
Ivory Coast ................. 247 227 274 303 268 323 236 185 194 -21.5
Kenya ...................... 278 192 168 172 189 195 197 203 144 -48.2
Malawi ..................... 1 11116321 . 0
Morocco .................... 564 711 469 484 511 482 452 418 442 -21.6
Nigeria ..................... 375 380 303 406 453 401 398 511 412 9.9
Senegal ..................... 116 130 115 100 97 97 89 77 100 -13.8
Sudan ...................... 47 43 35 38 244866 - 87.2
Tunisia ..................... 344 344 329 300 328 515 307 261 301 -12.5
Zaire ....................... 6 4 6 5 11 32 12 9 8 33.3
Zambia ..................... 49 30 37 37 19 29 24 33 42 -14.3
Zimbabwe .................. 50 33 54 45 37 32 28 6 7 -86.0
Other Africa ................ 103 173 235 118 152 153 143 157 98 -4.9
Asia-Paciﬁc ................ 86,691 85,623 87,032 78,304 73,044 70,042 69,004 68,713 68,729 -20.7
China ....................... 3,437 3,565 3,488 2,978 2,967 2,644 2,340 2,453 3,340 -2.8
India ....................... 5,136 5,036 5,069 5,221 5,196 5,518 5,427 5,655 5,790 12.7
Indonesia ................... 7,015 8,711 9,024 6,673 5,040 4,370 4,222 4,120 4,065 -42.1
Iran ........................ 1 290013000 . . .
Iraq ........................ 48 48 48 45 48 48 48 48 49 2.1
Israel ....................... 1,359 1,292 1,157 1,295 1,338 1,313 1,417 1,960 1,846 35.8
Jordan ...................... 166 193 168 160 157 167 205 190 203 22.3
Korea ....................... 23,397 22,939 25,270 22,192 20,202 18,211 17,335 18,006 17,027 -27.2
Kuwait ..................... 474 490 737 631 675 662 533 570 541 14.1
Macao ...................... 83 113 108 107 103 99 94 89 94 13.3
Malaysia .................... 7,536 6,952 6,700 5,954 5,290 5,373 5,919 6,457 6,456 -14.3
Oman ....................... 145 297 245 238 285 269 291 341 299 106.2
Pakistan .................... 2,062 2,075 2,123 2,037 1,808 1,768 1,504 1,528 1,366 -33.8
Philippines .................. 6,023 5,247 4,899 4,794 4,659 4,557 4,822 4,151 4,518 -25.0
Qatar ....................... 121 139 169 147 168 185 148 157 222 83.5
Saudi Arabia ................ 1,526 1,588 1,821 1,873 2,075 3,150 2,984 2,831 2,567 68.2
Sri Lanka ................... 53 80 50 71 75 79 58 59 68 28.3
Syria ....................... 5 55502001 - 80.0
Taiwan ..................... 13,307 12,596 12,821 12,413 12,667 12,175 12,883 12,085 12,561 -5.6
Thailand .................... 10,845 10,357 9,350 8,072 6,874 6,616 5,567 5,123 4,770 -56.0
United Arab Emirates ....... 1,265 1,139 1,014 1,115 975 1,079 1,456 1,287 1,271 .5
Other Asia-Paciﬁc ........... 2,687 2,732 2,766 2,283 2,441 1,754 1,751 1,603 1,675 -37.7
Eastern Europe ............ 12,589 15,983 11,880 14,152 14,299 9,136 8,517 7,536 7,321 -41.8
Bulgaria .................... 326 391 203 228 123 112 135 117 164 -49.7
Czech Republic ............. 1,399 1,575 1,330 1,535 1,648 1,890 1,719 1,573 1,383 -1.1
Hungary .................... 932 1,158 946 1,464 1,568 1,444 1,373 1,399 1,368 46.8
Poland ...................... 2,007 2,017 1,925 2,403 3,260 2,720 3,064 2,465 2,475 23.3
Romania .................... 256 294 178 222 222 225 221 168 131 -48.8
Russia ...................... 6,773 9,307 6,156 7,266 6,621 1,822 1,047 881 940 -86.1
Slovakia .................... 343 418 435 432 506 521 488 465 481 40.2
Other Eastern Europe ........ 553 823 707 602 351 402 470 468 379 -31.5
Latin America and
Caribbean ............. 92,427 102,557 100,693 108,275 106,763 102,605 104,334 106,529 103,960 12.5
Argentina ................... 17,018 20,422 20,033 22,571 22,869 22,405 23,620 24,792 23,975 40.9
Bolivia ..................... 202 184 262 276 356 562 569 559 574 184.2
Brazil ....................... 30,330 32,335 33,399 37,252 35,652 29,940 27,551 27,770 28,815 -5.0
Chile ....................... 10,566 11,178 11,705 11,692 11,731 11,115 10,889 10,771 8,614 -18.5
Colombia ................... 4,813 4,909 5,024 4,389 5,198 4,832 5,078 4,957 4,651 -3.4
Costa Rica .................. 120 133 140 165 176 174 238 239 274 128.3
Dominican Republic ......... 401 451 484 479 467 559 549 469 531 32.4
Ecuador .................... 1,068 1,321 905 949 912 867 956 732 656 -38.6
El Salvador ................. 461 401 457 442 443 438 376 395 435 -5.6
Guatemala .................. 326 437 370 387 446 723 634 509 483 48.2
Honduras ................... 118 136 152 169 194 181 199 180 169 43.2
Jamaica ..................... 222 249 218 236 253 246 256 227 249 12.2
Mexico ..................... 19,486 21,020 18,801 20,088 19,069 22,108 24,145 26,079 25,227 29.5
Nicaragua ................... 17 21 32 15 28 35 32 22 15 -11.8
Paraguay .................... 353 421 461 472 438 445 484 552 456 29.2
Peru ........................ 1,289 1,611 1,893 2,053 2,146 1,912 2,121 2,126 2,319 79.9
Trinidad and Tobago ........ 169 286 397 379 376 401 404 275 329 94.7
Uruguay .................... 1,530 1,604 1,667 1,698 1,711 1,936 2,128 1,959 1,953 27.6
Venezuela ................... 3,374 3,438 3,723 3,817 3,623 3,141 3,344 3,188 3,325 -1.5
Other Latin America and
Caribbean .............. 564 2,000 570 746 675 585 761 728 910 61.3
All ......................... 195,110 207,708 202,724 203,779 197,727 185,392 185,122 186,008 183,226 -6.1
. . . Not applicable.
84 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2000result, the relative share of claims among regions
shifted (table 3).
Cross-Border versus Local Claims
Over the June 1997–June 1999 period, cross-border
claims on emerging-market counterparties fell mark-
edly, while local claims rose somewhat. Cross-border
claims fell 18 percent as a result of declines in Asia
(36 percent) and Eastern Europe (60 percent). Unlike
Asia and Eastern Europe, cross-border claims on
Latin American counterparties rose slightly (table 4).
In the aggregate, local claims in emerging-market
countries grew 9 percent over the period (table 5).
Although local claims in Asia declined 6 percent
overall, only in Thailand did they fall consistently
over the period; in Korea, local claims actually rose
19 percent. The overall decrease in Asia was offset
by strong increases in Latin America, led by Argen-
tina (72 percent) and Mexico (96 percent).
One explanation for the disparity between move-
ments in cross-border and local claims is that U.S.
banks have made signiﬁcant efforts to establish a
local presence in many emerging-market countries, in
part because of expections of higher proﬁt margins
from banks’ local business.7 But establishing a proﬁt-
able local business usually requires a long-term
commitment to local markets. As a result, banks
have an incentive to maintain local market share and
stand by local counterparties in downturns. In addi-
tion, severe exchange-rate depreciation often accom-
panies emerging-market crises, as occurred in Asia
and Russia, so that dollar-denominated claims (usu-
ally in the form of cross-border claims) become more
expensive for emerging-market counterparties to
repay, given the decline in local currency relative to
the U.S. dollar. As a result, U.S. banks may have been
forced to write off more of these cross-border claims
as losses, may have decided against extending new
claims, or may have done both. Thus, supervisors
have an interest in monitoring the growth of cross-
border versus local claims because in a crisis, these
two types of claims might be affected differently.
7. A number of recently liberalized emerging markets are consid-
ered less competitive and may offer opportunities for higher proﬁts.
3. Distribution of total claims of U.S. banks on emerging-market counterparties, by region, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Percent
Region
1997, quarter ending 1998, quarter ending 1999, quarter ending
June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Total ........................... 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Africa .......................... 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8
Asia-Paciﬁc ..................... 44.4 41.2 42.9 38.4 36.9 37.8 37.3 36.9 37.5
Troubled Asia1 ............... 28.1 26.1 27.3 23.4 21.3 21.1 20.5 20.4 20.1
Eastern Europe .................. 6.5 7.7 5.9 6.9 7.2 4.9 4.6 4.1 4.0
Russia ........................ 3.5 4.5 3.0 3.6 3.3 1.0 .6 .5 .5
Latin America and Caribbean .... 47.4 49.4 49.7 53.1 54.0 55.3 56.4 57.3 56.7
Note. See notes to table 1. In this and the following tables, percentage dis-
tributions may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
1. The troubled Asian countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand.
4. Cross-border claims of U.S. banks on emerging-market counterparties, by region, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Millions of dollars except as noted
Region




June 1999 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Total ....................... 107,674 119,081 115,834 107,928 105,239 92,461 91,547 89,853 88,054 -18.2
Africa ...................... 1,661 1,979 1,543 1,413 1,719 1,369 1,411 1,210 1,193 -28.2
Asia-Paciﬁc ................. 43,092 45,783 47,839 37,145 33,701 30,872 28,480 28,516 27,651 -35.8
Troubled Asia1 ........... 30,018 32,803 34,658 25,555 21,877 18,736 16,757 16,367 14,758 -50.8
Eastern Europe .............. 8,916 11,494 7,664 9,208 9,562 5,233 4,822 3,984 3,580 -59.8
Russia .................... 5,359 7,202 4,434 5,204 5,031 1,624 909 737 699 -87.0
Latin America and Caribbean . 54,005 59,825 58,788 60,162 60,257 54,987 56,834 56,143 55,630 3.0
Note. See notes to table 1. 1. See note 1 to table 3.
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Derivatives Contracts
Over the past decade, off-balance-sheet transactions,
such as derivatives, have played an increasingly
larger role in U.S. banks’ overall business. The value
of derivatives contracts is based on—or ‘‘derived’’
from—the value of other ﬁnancial or economic vari-
ables, such as an exchange rate or a stock market
index. When these underlying variables exhibit strong
swings, the value of derivatives contracts can be
subject to similar or even more volatile swings,
depending on the type of contract. As the Asian crisis
began to unfold in the second half of 1997, U.S.
banks’ derivatives contracts with Asian counter-
parties rose in value, mostly because of sharp
declines in underlying variables in Asian economies.8
Revaluation gains on foreign exchange and deriva-
tives contracts during 1997–99 exhibited large swings
in value (table 6). For example, aggregate revaluation
gains jumped initially from $5 billion in June 1997 to
$17 billion in December 1997, but fell back to ini-
tial levels by June 1999. In troubled Asia, these value
swings were particularly pronounced: Year-end 1997
levels were nearly ﬁve times higher than levels just
six months earlier. At the height of the Asian crisis,
claims stemming from off-balance-sheet contracts
represented 22 percent of total claims on counterpar-
ties in troubled Asian countries but by June 1999 had
declined to only 4 percent of total claims (chart 1).
The drop occurred mostly for three reasons: The
underlying market factors recovered to some extent;
many of these contracts were short in duration; and
U.S. banks wrote off some of the contracts for which
payment seemed unlikely. Similar volatility in revalu-
ation gains occurred in Eastern Europe, although
in value; any decline in the baht relative to the dollar would result in a
gain for the U.S. bank and a loss for the Thai bank.
8. For example, before the onset of the crisis a U.S. bank may have
entered into a contract with a Thai bank in which the value of the
contract depended on the level of the Thai baht relative to the U.S.
dollar. The contract may have been structured such that it would have
a positive value from the U.S. bank’s perspective if the Thai baht fell
5. Local claims of U.S. banks on emerging-market counterparties, by region, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Millions of dollars except as noted
Region




June 1999 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Total ....................... 87,436 88,627 86,890 95,851 92,488 92,931 93,575 96,155 95,172 8.8
Africa ...................... 1,742 1,566 1,576 1,635 1,902 2,240 1,856 2,020 2,023 16.1
Asia-Paciﬁc ................. 43,599 39,840 39,193 41,159 39,343 39,170 40,524 40,197 41,078 -5.8
Troubled Asia1 ........... 24,798 21,403 20,585 22,130 20,188 20,391 21,108 21,490 22,078 -11.0
Eastern Europe .............. 3,673 4,489 4,216 4,944 4,737 3,903 3,695 3,552 3,741 1.9
Russia .................... 1,414 2,105 1,722 2,062 1,590 198 138 144 241 -83.0
Latin America and Caribbean . 38,422 42,732 41,905 48,113 46,506 47,618 47,500 50,386 48,330 25.8
Note. See notes to table 1. 1. See note 1 to table 3.
6. Revaluation gains of U.S. banks on foreign exchange and derivatives contracts with emerging-market counterparties,
by region, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Millions of dollars except as noted
Region




June 1999 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Total ....................... 5,377 11,712 16,681 12,190 11,406 11,312 8,993 8,560 5,480 1.9
Africa ...................... 261 292 226 179 339 195 198 20 49 -81.2
Asia-Paciﬁc ................. 3,519 7,794 13,551 8,996 7,846 6,869 5,816 4,769 2,616 -25.7
Troubled Asia1 ........... 2,717 6,983 12,306 7,775 6,457 5,237 4,167 3,394 1,593 -41.4
Eastern Europe .............. 346 1,282 492 597 709 965 601 387 207 -40.2
Russia .................... 75 898 71 144 203 157 74 14 0 -100.0
Latin America and Caribbean . 1,251 2,344 2,412 2,418 2,512 3,283 2,378 3,384 2,608 108.5
Note. See notes to table 1. See box ‘‘Types of Claims on Emerging-
Market Counterparties,’’ for a discussion of revaluation gains.
1. See note 1 to table 3.
86 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2000quarterly swings were not as extreme as those in
Asia.9 Revaluation gains as a percentage of total
claims reached 10 percent for claims in Eastern
Europe in September 1998, the peak of the Russian
crisis.
Revaluation gains on contracts with counterparties
in Latin America doubled over the period—to nearly
$3 billion. But peak levels were only one-quarter of
the peak levels reached in Asia, reﬂecting in part the
relatively less extreme movements in economic vari-
ables in Latin America. In addition, U.S. banks were
not as likely to engage in less-traditional, off-balance-
sheet activities (such as derivatives contracts) with
Latin American counterparties as they were with
counterparties in other regions.10
Large market declines during the Asian crisis gen-
erated rapid increases in counterparty credit risk for
U.S. banks. Essentially, U.S. banks were seeing the
market value of their contracts increase, but, in cer-
tain cases, so much so that the ability of some Asian
counterparties to make payments, given their large
losing positions in some contracts, came into ques-
tion. These contracts are generally marked to market
on a daily basis, so that losses create additional pres-
sure on foreign counterparties in the midst of a crisis.
Banking supervisors view the increased impor-
tance of revaluation gains during the past several
years as evidence of change in the nature of country
exposure. The increased use of, and broader marked-
to-market reporting of, derivatives contracts has high-
lighted the way that market risk and counterparty
credit risk interact. In particular, counterparty credit
risk can be negatively correlated with market risk,
so that a positive market move—from a U.S. bank’s
perspective—could quickly increase counterparty
credit risk. One of the important lessons from the
Asian crisis is that a U.S. bank could have completely
hedged its market risk and still faced signiﬁcant
counterparty credit risk if a change in market prices
affected the ability of the foreign counterparty to pay.
In the Russian crisis, some U.S. banks’ ability to
hedge local currency exposure broke down because
Russian banks—suffering heavy losses from the ruble
depreciation—were unable or unwilling to make pay-
ments owed to U.S. banks.
The fast-moving nature of derivatives markets
means that exposure can change more quickly than in
the past. Thus banks must rely on even better risk-
management techniques to ensure that they can man-
age latent counterparty credit risk that might arise
rapidly. In turn, supervisors must caution banks when
risk-management techniques do not appear to be fully
capturing the risks generated by derivatives contracts
with emerging-market counterparties.
The Asian and Russian crises provided lessons for
internationally active U.S. banks, and to some extent
the banks have been able to apply what they learned.
For example, a number of banks are integrating their
market risk and counterparty credit risk functions to
better manage cases in which one risk arises from the
other. In addition, more institutions are stress testing
their emerging-market portfolios—in effect ‘‘shock-
ing’’ their current portfolios with a range of possible
outcomes.11 In the Asian crisis, more thorough stress
testing before the events in 1997 might have provided
the banks with some warning about the negative
effects of severe exchange-rate depreciations.
Distribution by Counterparty Sector
Starting in June 1997, cross-border claims on coun-
terparties in all emerging-market countries were dis-
9. Contracts with Russian counterparties changed drastically in
value in August 1998 but by September had largely been charged off.
10. The crisis in Mexico and Latin America in 1994–95 may have
led U.S. banks to be more cautious about their derivatives business
with Latin American counterparties. In that crisis, a sharp devaluation
of the Mexican peso generated large derivatives (and other) losses
for Latin American counterparties of U.S. banks. In contrast, before
1997 many U.S. banks, and banks from other countries as well, may
have been less concerned about potential losses on contracts with
Asian counterparties.
11. For example, a U.S. bank might revalue its existing portfolio
based on a hypothetical increase in interest rates or a hypothetical
decline in the exchange rate.
1. Revaluation gains of U.S. banks on foreign exchange and
derivatives contracts with counterparties in troubled Asia








Note. Data are quarterly. Revaluation gains represent the market value of
foreign exchange and derivatives contracts. If the contract has a positive market
value for the U.S. bank, that amount is considered a revaluation gain, similar to a
claim in that the counterparty owes a payment to the U.S. bank.
The troubled Asian countries are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Thailand.
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nonbank private counterparties.12 By June 1999, the
distribution had shifted away from banks and toward
the nonbank private sector. Although claims on banks
represented 33 percent of all cross-border claims
in June 1997, the share had fallen to 25 percent by
June 1999. At the same time, the share of claims
on the nonbank sector rose from 36 percent to 42 per-
cent. This trend reﬂects to some extent the difﬁculties
experienced by certain emerging-market banks over
the period.
The shift in the distribution of claims among coun-
terparty sectors varied across regions. Much of the
shift in aggregate numbers occurred because of
changes in cross-border claims on Asian counterpar-
ties. In June 1997, banks represented 50 percent of
the total for Asia, the nonbank private sector 41 per-
cent, and the public sector 9 percent. By June 1999,
the distribution in Asia had shifted toward the public
sector and away from banks (table 7). A large num-
ber of Asian banks were hindered in their ability to
make good on liabilities because of their ﬁnancial
difﬁculties during the Asian crisis. As a result, U.S.
bankswroteoffsomeoftheirclaimsonAsiancounter-
parties or at least did not renew them once payment
was received. A second factor affecting the aggregate
sectoral distribution was the relative increase in
claims on Latin American counterparties (as dis-
cussed previously). The cross-border claims on Latin
American counterparties were distributed more
between the public sector and nonbank private sector,
so that this region’s increased share of the aggre-
gate contributed to the overall sectoral pattern
over the two years. In Russia, the precipitous fall in
cross-border claims was driven largely by a 92 per-
cent decline in claims on the public sector, repre-
senting a default by the Russian government on its
foreign-currency bonds in August and September
1998.
Distribution by Maturity
On the whole, the maturity distribution of cross-
border claims on counterparties in emerging-market
countries indicates the continued prevalence of short-
term credits.13 For example, the share of cross-border
claims with a maturity of one year or less held steady
over the period, accounting for two-thirds of cross-
border claims. In June 1997, short-term claims on
Asian counterparties accounted for about 75 percent
of total cross-border claims on counterparties in that
region, with the share falling to 65 percent after the
crisis. At the beginning of the period, U.S. banks held
many short-term claims on Asian banks but, in some
instances, did not roll over extensions of credit dur-
ing and immediately after the crisis.
In Latin America, the maturity distribution shifted
slightly toward the short term, but the level of short-
term claims remained below that in emerging Asia.
The lower percentage of short-term claims in Latin
America may have resulted from a greater share
12. Breakdowns by counterparty sector are not reported for local
claims; they are available only for cross-border claims.
13. Maturity data are based on initial claims before adjustments for
guarantees and do not include revaluation gains.
7. Distribution of cross-border claims of U.S. banks on emerging-market counterparties, by region and counterparty sector,
1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Percent
Region and counterparty sector
1997, quarter ending 1998, quarter ending 1999, quarter ending
June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Africa
Banks ............................ 20.0 13.6 16.7 19.3 18.5 20.7 25.8 25.1 26.2
Public sector ...................... 72.7 67.6 69.1 69.2 65.7 64.0 58.7 55.3 52.3
Nonbank private sector ............ 7.2 18.7 14.3 11.5 15.8 15.3 15.5 19.6 21.5
Asia-Paciﬁc
Banks ............................ 49.9 49.9 48.5 42.5 42.8 39.1 40.4 37.6 35.2
Public sector ...................... 8.9 10.2 11.1 13.8 15.8 19.0 19.7 19.5 22.8
Nonbank private sector ............ 41.2 39.9 40.4 43.6 41.4 41.9 40.0 42.9 42.0
Eastern Europe
Banks ............................ 11.9 9.4 13.3 13.8 17.1 23.1 22.4 24.9 17.6
Public sector ...................... 77.6 82.1 72.8 72.6 68.4 52.5 49.9 48.8 54.8
Nonbank private sector ............ 10.6 8.4 14.0 13.7 14.5 24.4 27.7 26.3 27.7
Latin America and Caribbean
Banks ............................ 22.2 21.4 24.7 25.1 26.3 26.3 21.2 20.4 20.3
Public sector ...................... 41.4 40.6 35.1 32.8 30.5 26.7 33.6 34.3 36.5
Nonbank private sector ............ 36.5 38.0 40.2 42.2 43.2 47.0 45.3 45.3 43.2
Note. See notes to table 1.
88 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2000of loans to the public sector, which generally have a
longer maturity.
The share of short-term claims in cross-border
claims on Eastern Europe fell from a peak of 78 per-
cent in June 1998 to 62 percent in June 1999. By this
time, most of the short-term speculative positions
in Russian government debt had been closed out. In
general, the prevalence of short-term claims indicates
that U.S. banks were cautious about extending matu-
rities of claims on emerging-market counterparties in
order to have the ability to reduce exposure quickly if
a crisis developed.
Initial Claims and Adjustments for Guarantees
As noted previously, U.S. banks report initial cross-
border claims before adjustments for guarantees.
Comparing initial claims and adjusted claims shows
the extent to which the ultimate risk on those claims
is being borne by counterparties outside the country
of the initial borrower.14 Subtracting claims adjusted
for guarantees from initial claims provides a ﬁgure
for net credit guarantees received (if positive) or net
credit guarantees extended by counterparties in those
countries (if negative) on initial claims held by U.S.
banks. In the aggregate, for claims initiated by U.S.
banks, counterparties in emerging-market countries
were net receivers of guarantees over the period,
meaning that they received more guarantees than
they offered. In addition, the percentage of initial
claims that received guarantees rose from 10 percent
in 1997 to 18 percent in 1999. Not surprisingly, these
data indicate that initial claims on emerging-market
counterparties held by U.S. banks were sometimes
protected by guarantees from counterparties in devel-
oped countries or from international development
banks. In fact, U.S. banks may have sought greater
protection on those initial claims, given the crises in
emerging markets.
Interestingly, in 1997 counterparties in emerging
Asia were net granters of credit guarantees on the
initial claims of U.S. banks because of roughly $3 bil-
lion in guarantees extended by Korean counter-
parties, particularly large Korean conglomerates, or
chaebols.15 That trend in Asia reversed as Korean
chaebols encountered ﬁnancial difﬁculties, so that
by 1998 counterparties in Asia, as a group, were net
receivers of credit guarantees on initial claims.
Regarding other regions, Latin American counter-
parties were net receivers of credit guarantees over
the entire period, with the amounts ranging between
15 percent and 18 percent of initial claims. The most
drastic increase occurred in Eastern Europe, where
by June 1999, nearly half of all initial claims were
guaranteed.16
Claims in Relation to Total Assets
and to Tier 1 Capital
Examined in isolation, the outstanding claims on
emerging-market counterparties held by U.S. banks
give only a partial view of the relative importance of
emerging-market activity for banks. For a more com-
plete picture, supervisors must examine claims as a
percentage of assets and as a percentage of capital.
Claims as a percentage of capital, in particular, pro-
vide supervisors with an initial assessment of U.S.
banks’ ability to weather the potentially volatile
nature of emerging markets.
Over the two-year period, emerging-market claims
as a percentage of U.S. bank assets (for those banks
reporting country exposure data) fell from 6.7 percent
of total assets to 4.5 percent, a result more of the
overall increase in total assets than of the decline in
claims (table 8). For example, even though total
claims on counterparties in Latin America registered
double-digit growth, that growth rate was outpaced
by that of the reporting banks’ total assets, thus
driving the percentage of claims-to-assets for that
region lower. The decline in this percentage for Asian
counterparties, for which claims fell, was even more
dramatic.
Total claims as a percentage of tier 1 capital peaked
in September 1997 at 105 percent (table 8).17 How-
ever, by June 1999 that percentage had fallen to
72 percent, a decline stemming mostly from a signiﬁ-
cant increase in tier 1 capital (chart 2). Total claims
on Latin American counterparties as a percentage of
tier 1 capital fell slightly over the period, but never
14. For example, if a U.S. bank held a claim on a Chinese ﬁrm in
the amount of $100 million, and if $20 million of that claim were
guaranteed by a French bank, then initial claims on China would be
$100 million, adjusted claims on China would be $80 million, and
adjusted claims on France would increase $20 million.
15. Guarantees extended by Korean counterparties were not
restricted to claims on other Korean counterparties; some guarantees
applied to initial claims held by U.S banks on other counterparties in
emerging Asia.
16. U.S. banks are increasingly involved with credit derivatives,
which transfer counterparty credit risk to a third party. As the credit
derivatives market grows, there may be many more cases in which
supervisors will want to examine shifts in counterparty credit risk
from the initial obligor to a third party, similar to the way guarantees
transfer risk.
17. Tier 1 capital generally consists of common stockholders’
equity, noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and any related sur-
plus, and minority interests in equity capital accounts of consolidated
subsidiaries
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counterparties fell from 45 percent of tier 1 capital to
27 percent. Total claims on Eastern European coun-
terparties peaked at 8 percent of tier 1 capital about
one year before the onset of the crisis in Russia.
Generally, internationally active U.S. banks reduced
their exposure to emerging markets while bolstering
their capital.
As discussed earlier, supervisors cannot assess
country risk by simply looking at the absolute levels
of claims. Claims-to-capital ﬁgures serve as a pre-
liminary indicator of how much cushion U.S. banks
might have available to absorb potential losses in
their emerging-market portfolios. When viewed at
the level of the individual institution, these ﬁgures
allow supervisors to recognize those institutions with
high exposure relative to capital. Banks identiﬁed
as having elevated claims-to-capital ratios receive
greater supervisory scrutiny in the area of country
risk. For example, supervisors would focus on a bank
with a claims-to-capital ratio of more than 100 per-
cent, even if the amount of claims was small. But
claims-to-capital ratios, on their own, might not
always reﬂect the underlying riskiness of the claims
or the ability of the banks to manage that risk,
so supervisors conduct assessments of the risk-
management systems of individual banks to achieve a
more accurate picture of how country risk is affecting
those institutions.
For the most part, U.S. banks did not suffer large
losses stemming directly from emerging-market cri-
ses in recent years. When banks did suffer losses,
they were generally able to offset them with earnings
from other business segments.18 In fact, the ability of
U.S. banks to charge their losses in Asia and Russia
against income—rather than drawing down their
capital—indicates both their high levels of overall
proﬁtability during this period and their low levels of
exposure. It is possible, however, that a similar period
of international crisis coinciding with a domestic
downturn in the United States might have put pres-
sure on U.S. banks’ capital positions.
18. See Antulio N. Bomﬁm and William R. Nelson, ‘‘Proﬁts and
Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 1998,’’
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 85 (June 1999), pp. 369–95.
8. Total claims of U.S. banks on emerging-market counterparties as a percentage of reporting banks’ assets
and reporting banks’ tier 1 capital, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Region
1997, quarter ending 1998, quarter ending 1999, quarter ending
June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Percentage of reporting banks’ total assets
Total emerging-market claims ........ 6.7 6.8 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.3 4.8 4.8 4.5
Africa ................................ .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Asia-Paciﬁc ........................... 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7
Troubled Asia1 ..................... 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 .9
Eastern Europe ........................ .4 .5 .4 .4 .4 .3 .2 .2 .2
Russia .............................. .2 .3 .2 .2 .2 .1 .0 .0 .0
Latin America and Caribbean .......... 3.2 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6
Percentage of reporting banks’ tier 1 capital
Total emerging-market claims ........ 102.1 104.6 97.0 93.9 88.5 80.3 75.7 73.2 72.3
Africa ................................ 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3
Asia-Paciﬁc ........................... 45.4 43.1 41.6 36.1 32.7 30.3 28.2 27.0 27.1
Troubled Asia1 ..................... 28.7 27.3 26.4 22.0 18.8 17.0 15.5 14.9 14.5
Eastern Europe ........................ 6.6 8.0 5.7 6.5 6.4 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.9
Russia .............................. 3.5 4.7 2.9 3.3 3.0 .8 .4 .3 .4
Latin America and Caribbean .......... 48.4 51.6 48.2 49.9 47.8 44.5 42.7 41.9 41.0
Note. For a deﬁnition of tier 1 capital, see text note 17. 1. See note 1 to table 3.
2. U.S. banks’ emerging-market claims compared with













Note. Tier 1 capital consists of common stockholders’ equity, non-
cumulative perpetual preferred stock and any related surplus, and minority
interests in equity capital accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Tier 1 capital
data cover only banks that ﬁle the Country Exposure Report.
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The discussion thus far has centered on U.S. banks in
the aggregate. However, because most of the claims
on emerging-market counterparties are concentrated
at a small number of U.S. banks, a smaller capital
base is available to absorb their potential losses.
Serious country exposure difﬁculties at just a few
of these banks would have the potential to trigger
broader problems within the entire U.S. banking sys-
tem. In general, supervisors focus on the riskiness of
any U.S. bank’s foreign claims but are particularly
sensitive to the implications of exposure at large
banks.
The U.S. banks that report in the ‘‘Money Center
Banks’’ category on the Country Exposure Report
generally represent those with the largest claims on
counterparties in emerging-market countries.19 Over
the 1997–99 period, money center banks consistently
accounted for about 80 percent of total claims on
counterparties in emerging markets and more than
40 percent of the total assets of all U.S. banks.
For the money center banks, the share of their
emerging-market claims in total assets fell from
13 percent in 1997 to 6 percent in 1999 (table 9).
Commensurate with that decline was a decrease
in emerging-market claims as a percentage of tier 1
capital, from a peak of 232 percent in 1997 to
113 percent in 1999. Notably, the decrease in this
percentage stemmed largely from an 88 percent
increase in tier 1 capital.
Analyzing the claims-to-capital ratio for money
center banks is especially important, given the con-
centration of claims on emerging-market counter-
parties at these banks. Whenever claims-to-capital
ratios are identiﬁed as particularly high, supervisors
may conduct a special analysis of the selected bank’s
ability to manage country risk in the context of
broader risk-management functions.
EMERGING-MARKET EXPOSURE OF BANKS
FROM OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Brieﬂy comparing U.S. banks’ exposure to emerging-
market countries over 1997–99 with the exposure of
banks from other developed countries provides some
overall context for assessing the relative role played
by U.S. banks. U.S. banks, along with banks from
other developed countries, report their country expo-
sure data to the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), which then compiles data for all of its mem-
bers and reports the consolidated results.20
From June 1997 to June 1999, BIS reporting bank
claims on emerging-market counterparties fell in
the aggregate from $829 billion to $782 billion
(table 10). Claims on Asian counterparties fell 20 per-
cent, while claims on Latin American and African
counterparties rose. By June 1999, claims on Asia
still represented the largest share of total emerging-
market claims, but by a smaller margin because of an
increase in the share of claims on Latin American
counterparties. Compared with U.S. bank data on
emerging-market claims, the shifts for Asia and Latin
America were relatively similar; however, claims
on Eastern European counterparties fell only slightly
for all BIS reporting banks, and claims on African
counterparties increased almost one-third.
BIS Reporting Bank Claims
by Country of Origin
In June 1997, claims held by U.S. banks accounted
for 13 percent of the cross-border claims on
emerging-market counterparties held by all BIS
19. Over time, this group has varied in size from six to nine banks
(currently six). See the Country Exposure Lending Survey for details.
20. These data represent cross-border claims from individual coun-
try submissions of claims on non-BIS member countries. The data are
consolidated at the BIS to eliminate any double counting and do not
include revaluation gains on off-balance-sheet contracts or adjust-
ments for guarantees (for details on BIS data, see www.bis.org). BIS
member countries include the Group of Ten, plus Austria, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, and Spain. Because the BIS
does not collect capital ﬁgures for these countries, claims-to-capital
ratios cannot be calculated.
9. Total claims of U.S. money center banks on emerging-market counterparties as a percentage of their total assets
and tier 1 capital 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Item
1997, quarter ending 1998, quarter ending 1999, quarter ending
June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30 Sept. 30 Dec. 31 Mar. 31 June 30
Total emerging-market claims
as a percentage of total assets ..... 13.1 13.4 12.3 11.9 11.1 8.4 7.2 6.9 6.3
Total emerging-market claims
as a percentage of tier 1 capital ... 225.7 232.2 205.9 204.4 190.0 144.4 121.8 113.0 112.6
Note. For a deﬁnition of tier 1 capital, see text note 17.
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highest share, with Germany a close second. Over the
two-year period, the share held by U.S. banks fell
slightly. The share of Japan’s banks dropped signiﬁ-
cantly. Japanese banks were facing considerable
domestic ﬁnancial difﬁculties over this period, which
contributed to their retrenchment in emerging mar-
kets. Most European reporting banks increased their
relative positions.
BIS Reporting Bank Claims
by Emerging-Market Region
A regional breakdown indicates that the relative
shares were not uniform by emerging-market regions.
Japanese banks held nearly 30 percent of all claims
on Asian counterparties in June 1997, but that share
had fallen to 23 percent by June 1999. That decline
can be compared with a slight increase in the portion
of claims on Asian counterparties held by European
banks (nearly 50 percent), while the share held by
U.S. banks remained relatively steady (7 percent). In
Latin America, U.S. banks held a large share (25 per-
cent), while European banks, as a group, expanded
their share of claims to more than 50 percent, led by
a rise in the share of Spanish banks. German and
other European banks accounted for about two-thirds
of all BIS reporting bank claims on Eastern Europe,
while the share held by U.S. banks fell by half, to
5 percent.
10. Distribution of total claims of BIS reporting banks on emerging-market counterparties, by region, 1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Region






June 30 Dec. 31 June 30 Dec. 31 June 30
Total claims on emerging-market counterparties (millions of dollars)
All emerging-market countries ...... 828,567 862,147 835,606 798,184 781,971 -5.6
Africa ........................... 34,179 35,637 41,536 41,911 45,028 31.7
Asia-Paciﬁc ...................... 430,366 423,683 371,489 351,268 344,237 -20.0
Eastern Europe .................. 116,188 122,445 131,561 121,619 110,988 -4.5
Latin America and Caribbean ..... 247,834 280,382 291,020 283,386 281,718 13.7
Distribution of cross-border claims among emerging-market regions (percent)
All emerging-market countries ...... 100 100 100 100 100 . . .
Africa ........................... 4.1 4.1 5.0 5.3 5.8 . . .
Asia-Paciﬁc ...................... 51.9 49.1 44.5 44.0 44.0 . . .
Eastern Europe .................. 14.0 14.2 15.7 15.2 14.2 . . .
Latin America and Caribbean ..... 29.9 32.5 34.8 35.5 36.0 . . .
. . . Not applicable.
11. Distribution of cross-border claims of BIS reporting banks on emerging-market counterparties, by lending country,
1997:Q2–1999:Q2
Country






June 30 Dec. 31 June 30 Dec. 31 June 30
Total cross-border claims on emerging-market counterparties (millions of dollars)
All reporting banks ................. 828,567 862,147 835,606 798,184 781,971 -5.6
United States .................... 109,462 107,770 103,685 94,299 96,539 -11.8
Japan ............................ 146,092 137,563 120,797 108,643 94,050 -35.6
Germany ........................ 139,626 147,911 147,484 154,347 155,079 11.1
France ........................... 82,824 95,683 92,090 87,750 91,054 9.9
United Kingdom ................. 55,260 63,607 65,728 64,504 58,141 5.2
Other Europe .................... 130,830 149,710 160,941 159,250 149,168 14.0
All others ....................... 164,473 159,904 144,881 129,392 137,940 -16.1
Distribution of cross-border claims amoung reporting banks from BIS-member countries (percent)
All reporting banks ................. 100 100 100 100 100 . . .
United States .................... 13.2 12.5 12.4 11.8 12.3 . . .
Japan ............................ 17.6 16.0 14.5 13.6 12.0 . . .
Germany ........................ 16.9 17.2 17.6 19.3 19.8 . . .
France ........................... 10.0 11.1 11.0 11.0 11.6 . . .
United Kingdom ................. 6.7 7.4 7.9 8.1 7.4 . . .
Other Europe .................... 15.8 17.4 19.3 20.0 19.1 . . .
All others ....................... 19.9 18.5 17.3 16.2 17.6 . . .
Note. Data in this table do not include adjustments for guarantees; as a
result, data for U.S. banks may differ from data reported in earlier tables.
. . . Not applicable.
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general reduction in claims on emerging-market
counterparties contrasted with the rise in claims held
by most European banks. Banks from European
countries appear to be expanding cross-border lend-
ing to emerging-market counterparties, despite the
events of recent years, whereas U.S. banks have
focused their efforts more on Latin America. Japa-
nese banks have had little choice but to scale back
their emerging-market business because of capital
pressures.
U.S. COUNTRY EXPOSURE DATA BEFORE 1997
Supervisors still draw on valuable lessons from the
past in evaluating recent country exposure data.
While it is not within the scope of this article to
conduct an extensive analysis of country exposure
data over several decades, a brief examination of
trends since 1982 provides a necessary context for
more accurate analysis of the 1997–99 period.21 In
particular, drawing comparisons with data from crises
in the 1980s, in which U.S. banks suffered siz-
able losses on their developing-country portfolios, is
useful.22
Despite some changes in how claims are reported,
data from before and after 1997 are relatively com-
parable.23 Therefore, it is possible to view the
1997–99 period in the context of broader trends in
country exposure, including claims on emerging-
market counterparties.
Cross-Border and Local Claims, 1982 to 1998
In examining country exposure data for selected years
from 1982 to 1998, the ﬁrst item of interest is that
total claims on counterparties in emerging-market
countries—in absolute terms—were nearly as high
in the 1980s as in 1998, with cross-border claims
in 1982 and 1986 actually exceeding cross-border
claims in 1998 (table 12). However, local claims
underwent tremendous growth from 1982 to
1998—an astounding 566 percent. The increasing
importance of local claims during the 1997–99 period
is thus part of a long-term trend. In some sense, this
trend reﬂects the market penetration achieved by U.S.
banks in local banking markets during the past
decade. In addition, the relatively larger portion of
local claims means that the transfer risk element of
country risk is lessened insofar as more claims are
denominated and funded in local currency.24 How-
ever, the counterparty credit risk element of country
exposure may have increased because in the recent
period, fewer claims have an explicit or implicit
public-sector guarantee than in the period before
1997.25
Distribution by Counterparty Sector,
1982 to 1998
The composition, not just the levels, of emerging-
market claims changed from the 1980s to the late
1990s, particularly the distribution of claims by coun-
terparty sector.26 In 1986 and 1990, cross-border
claims on the public sector represented one-half of
total cross-border claims. Soon thereafter, the shift
away from public-sector lending began; by 1998 the
distribution had changed markedly, with claims on
the nonbank private sector at nearly one-half of
total claims. Although there was a general shift
toward the nonbank private sector, claims on public-
sector counterparties in Latin America and claims on
banks in Asia remained signiﬁcant.
Distribution by Maturity, 1982 to 1998
The maturity distribution has also shifted since the
early 1980s, with more claims classiﬁed as short-
term (one year or less). In 1982, short-term claims
represented one-half of all claims but fell below
50 percent in 1986 and 1990. By 1994, short-term
claims had risen, to 60 percent of total claims. This
21. Data from 1998 are included to provide an overlapping com-
parison (at intervals of four years) of earlier data with the 1997–99
period.
22. U.S. banks began reporting on the Country Exposure Report in
1978, so the data series captures the entire period of crisis in develop-
ing countries during the 1980s.
23. As discussed earlier, data on revaluation gains were not col-
lected before June 1997. In addition, the deﬁnition of local claims was
altered slightly in June 1997. However, cross-border measures are
nearly identical before and after June 1997, and the deﬁnitional
change in local claims affects only a few countries. (See note 3 in box
‘‘Types of Claims.’’)
24. Transfer risk applies to cross-border claims and any local
claims not funded by local liabilities. For the most part, growth in
local liabilities has kept pace with growth in local claims.
25. The signiﬁcance of this development became clear in both the
Asian and the Russian crises, as expectations that local country gov-
ernments would provide guarantees for banks and nonbank companies
were not realized.
26. The same methodology used to examine data from the 1997–99
period ﬁts this broader comparison as well, except that cross-border
revaluation gains were not reported before 1997 and thus are excluded
from the 1998 ﬁgures to ensure comparability.
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of total claims may have been directly tied to
the developing-country debt crisis. Speciﬁcally, as
emerging-market counterparties encountered difﬁ-
culty in repaying debts, U.S. banks closed out many
of their short positions and ceased to roll over short-
12. Claims of U.S. banks on foreign counterparties, by type of claim and region, selected years, 1982–98
Item 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998
Total claims (millions of dollars)
Developed countries and banking centers ...... 278,948 286,671 269,235 280,718 466,965
Cross-border .................................... 213,478 185,713 152,314 160,218 259,314
Local ........................................... 65,470 100,958 116,921 120,500 207,651
Emerging markets ............................. 150,925 132,988 85,281 122,724 176,129
Cross-border .................................... 137,040 116,072 61,938 79,876 83,629
Local ........................................... 13,885 16,916 23,343 42,848 92,500
Africa .......................................... 7,612 4,110 2,344 1,682 3,069
Cross-border .................................. 7,119 3,662 1,898 1,131 1,213
Local ......................................... 493 448 446 551 1,856
Asia-Paciﬁc ..................................... 46,614 36,581 31,919 51,199 63,188
Cross-border .................................. 40,558 28,190 18,204 27,237 23,386
Local ......................................... 6,056 8,391 13,715 23,962 39,802
Eastern Europe .................................. 5,876 3,710 2,086 4,551 7,916
Cross-border .................................. 5,876 3,585 1,830 2,424 4,292
Local ......................................... 0 125 256 2,127 3,624
Latin America .................................. 90,823 88,587 48,932 65,292 101,956
Cross-border .................................. 83,487 80,635 40,006 49,084 54,738
Local ......................................... 7,336 7,952 8,926 16,208 47,218
Total claims as a percentage of total assets
Developed countries and banking centers ....... 22.1 17.8 14.4 12.8 11.5
Cross-border .................................... 16.9 11.5 8.1 7.3 6.4
Local ........................................... 5.2 6.3 6.2 5.5 5.1
Emerging markets ............................. 12.0 8.2 4.5 5.6 4.3
Cross-border .................................... 10.9 7.2 3.3 3.6 2.1
Local ........................................... 1.1 1.0 1.2 2.0 2.3
Africa .......................................... .6 .3 .1 .1 .1
Cross-border .................................. .6 .2 .1 .1 .0
Local ......................................... .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Asia-Paciﬁc ..................................... 3.7 2.3 1.7 2.3 1.6
Cross-border .................................. 3.2 1.7 1.0 1.2 .6
Local ......................................... .5 .5 .7 1.1 1.0
Eastern Europe .................................. .5 .2 .1 .2 .2
Cross-border .................................. .5 .2 .1 .1 .1
Local ......................................... .0 .0 .0 .1 .1
Latin America .................................. 7.2 5.5 2.6 3.0 2.5
Cross-border .................................. 6.6 5.0 2.1 2.2 1.4
Local ......................................... .6 .5 .5 .7 1.2
Total claims as a percentage of total capital
Developed countries and banking centers ....... 395.1 246.7 166.5 125.3 110.2
Cross-border .................................... 302.4 159.8 94.2 71.5 61.2
Local ........................................... 92.7 86.9 72.3 53.8 49.0
Emerging markets ............................. 213.8 114.4 52.7 54.8 41.6
Cross-border .................................... 194.1 99.9 38.3 35.7 19.7
Local ........................................... 19.7 14.6 14.4 19.1 21.8
Africa .......................................... 10.8 3.5 1.4 .8 .7
Cross-border .................................. 10.1 3.2 1.2 .5 .3
Local ......................................... .7 .4 .3 .2 .4
Asia-Paciﬁc ..................................... 66.0 31.5 19.7 22.9 14.9
Cross-border .................................. 57.4 24.3 11.3 12.2 5.5
Local ......................................... 8.6 7.2 8.5 10.7 9.4
Eastern Europe .................................. 8.3 3.2 1.3 2.0 1.9
Cross-border .................................. 8.3 3.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
Local ......................................... .0 .1 .2 .9 .9
Latin America .................................. 128.6 76.2 30.3 29.2 24.1
Cross-border .................................. 118.3 69.4 24.7 21.9 12.9
Local ......................................... 10.4 6.8 5.5 7.2 11.1
Note. In this table, ﬁgures for claims as a percentage of total assets and
for claims as a percentage of total capital in 1998 are not consistent with
1998 ﬁgures in table 8 for two reasons: The ﬁgures in this table do not include
revaluation gains (see text note 26); also total capital is used in this table instead
of tier 1 capital (see text note 28).
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So the percentage of short-term claims in the total
fell. U.S. banks later became more comfortable
extending new credits to emerging markets, starting
with short-term claims. The resumption of short-term
lending was perhaps an indicator of U.S. banks’
changed attitude toward lending to emerging-market
counterparties.
Claims Relative to Total Assets and Capital,
1982 to 1998
More revealing comparisons emerge from an exami-
nation of claims as a percentage of total assets and
claims as a percentage of capital.28 Claims on coun-
terparties in emerging-market countries as a percent-
age of total assets were as high as 12 percent in 1982
but fell sharply, as banks reduced their emerging-
market portfolios during the debt crisis of the 1980s.
Claims on emerging-market counterparties as a
percentage of total capital in 1982 were well above
200 percent, much larger than the 42 percent
recorded in 1998.
The fallout from the debt crisis of the 1980s caused
the major downward shift in claims as a percentage
of total assets and claims as a percentage of capital.
By 1990, U.S. banks had lowered their claims-to-
capital ratios, primarily as a result of the decrease in
total claims as U.S. banks retrenched (chart 3). In
1994 and 1998, the reduction in the claims-to-capital
percentages came as a result of improved capital
positions and not from a reduction in claims.
In the 1980s, U.S. banks’ emerging-market claims-
to-capital ratios were much higher than current ratios.
The overall decline in these ratios provides some
assurance that emerging-market country exposure
poses less of a potential threat to U.S. banks today
than a decade ago. However, the relative riskiness of
claims must be taken into account to develop a more
accurate overall picture of those risks. Also, there is
an increasing trend toward marking claims to market,
meaning that a change in their value can have a direct
effect on a bank’s reported income; in the 1980s, the
process of ﬁrst provisioning for, and then writing off,
claims meant that losses in emerging markets were
reported on a lagged basis. While the trend toward
better disclosure is generally welcome, it does mean
that any losses may have an immediate, and some-
times volatile, effect on banks’ capital, forcing them
to be more adept at managing risks in relation to their
capital. Indeed, U.S. banks today apply a number of
risk-management techniques that were not widely
used in the 1980s, such as measurements of potential
exposure, distributions of possible loss amounts, and
estimates of capital at risk.
CONCLUSION
U.S. banks continue to be active in emerging-market
countries despite the crises in recent years. Claims
held by U.S. banks on counterparties in Asia and
Eastern Europe declined over 1997–99, as U.S. banks
either suffered losses on claims or actively reduced
their exposure to those regions. Claims on counter-
parties in Latin America increased over the period,
perhaps an indication that U.S. banks rely on their
longer-standing, more entrenched ties to that region
and likely view it as a strategic growth area. How-
ever, for all regions the claims-to-capital ratios
have fallen, a result of U.S. banks bolstering their
capital over the entire period—international crises
notwithstanding.
Banking supervisors determine the potential threat
from international exposures by identifying risk areas
27. The short-term claims that were granted anew often came in the
form of trade credits, which were considered much less risky.
28. Because tier 1 capital was not reported before 1990, capital
ﬁgures used in the comparisons consist of equity capital, subordinated
debentures, and reserves for loan losses, or what is referred to as total
capital. This measure of capital was used on the Country Exposure
Lending Survey until 1998, when tier 1 capital was adopted.
3. U.S. banks’ emerging-market claims compared with
total capital, selected years, 1982–98













Note. Data for 1998 were included to provide an overlapping comparison (at
intervals of four years) of earlier data with the data from 1997–99. However,
data on revaluation gains were not collected before 1997, so revaluation gains
for 1998 were excluded from this chart to ensure comparability with data from
earlier years. Total capital data cover only banks that ﬁle the Country Exposure
Report.
Because tier 1 capital was not reported before 1990, capital ﬁgures used in
these comparisons consist of equity capital, subordinated debentures, and
reserves for loan losses, or what is referred to as total capital. This measure of
capital was used in the Country Exposure Lending Survey until 1998, when
tier 1 capital was adopted.
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ing those claims, and evaluating banks’ ability to
manage the risks associated with those claims. In
particular, high claims-to-capital ratios for U.S. banks
act as a signal for supervisors to focus on speciﬁc
U.S. banks or, in some cases, groups of banks. Such a
signal, in turn, may require a more detailed analysis
of country risk at the institutions in question. Finally,
supervisors evaluate the manner in which country
risk is being managed along with the other risks
facing U.S. banks.
96 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 2000